Workers also organized CIO locals in many of Iowa's industrial communities. Historians have largely ignored Iowa because tbe profiles of most of the state's industrial cities during the period did not correspond to those of tbe larger industrial cities in which the CIO took hold. Most of Iowa's manufacturing cities were smaller, most contained only one or two large industries, and they usually did not include significant numbers of new immigrant or nonwhite workers. By examining the evolution of tbe CIO movement in Ottumwa, particularly at the John Morrell and Co. meatpacking plant, it is possible to assess the origins and eventual sources of conflict in the crucial period from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s in a portion of America's labor movement that historians typically neglect.Ô ttumwa's meatpacking workers formed a packing community out of which they forged a CIO movement during the late 1930s to early 1940s. The community was characterized by a closely knit neighborhood and a shared cultural identity. The CIO movement expressed the workers' desire to eliminate the company's "drive" system of supervision and dictatorial managerial control. Workers sought greater participation in the production process partly through collective bargaining. Tbeir solidarity also made it possible to assert their collective power on the shop floor. Finally, tbey translated the union drive at the plant into a larger political movement that gave the packing community a more powerful voice in the city's politics as a whole.
Flint. Michigan (New Brunswick, NJ, 1987) ; Gary Gerstle, Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 1914 -1960 (Cambridge, 1989 ; and Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919 -1939 (Cambridge, 1990 . 2. James C. Larew's A Party Reborn: The Democrats of Iowa, 1950 -1974 (Iowa City, 1980 ) is one of the very few studies that treats the impact of the CIO and organized labor on the political landscape in Iowa. My forthcoming dissertation, "Working-Class Structural Pluralism and the Limits of the New Deal Order: Midwestern Meatpacking Workers, 1935 Workers, -1955 " (University of Pittsburgh), explores workers' union and partisan political behavior in Omaha, Topeka, St. Joseph, and Ottumwa. I selected these communities so I could focus on their diverse economic and social demographic characteristics. In each community, ethnic, racial, and/or urban-rural conflicts contributed to the limits of meatpacking workers' reform efforts. Between 1945 and 1954 class conflict shook the Morrell plant and Ottumwa's politics, as Morrell's management and Ottumwa's business and professional groups offered a unified response to the packing community's challenge to their power. The company adopted new managerial strategies and employment policies designed to strike at the heart of the packing community's solidarity, which eroded considerably after the nationwide United Packinghouse Workers of America (CIO) strike in 1948. Although Morrell did not eliminate the union from the plant, the company and its business and professional allies in the city did curtail the union's power to influence crucial production decisions on the shop floor and blunted much of its citywide political influence. By the mid-1950s, the local union at Morrell no longer embraced a packing community.
DURING THE MID-1930s, Ottumwa's packing workers shared a cohesive class and cultural identity. In addition to a collective neighborhood, cultural, religious, and associational identity, their sense of community had also been shaped by a shared sense of grievance about their position in the city relative to its elites. Ethnicity and neighborhood ties among Ottumwa's packing workers had been evident as early as 1900. In that year, 60 percent of Morrell's employees were nativeborn of native parents; the remaining 40 percent consisted of mostly second-generation and some foreign-born Americans of English, Irish, Swedish, and German descent. About two-thirds of the packing community resided in the immediate environs of the plant in Ottumwa's east end. These patterns changed little by 1915.3 Especially during the 1920s and early 1930s, broader cultural alliances solidified the packing workers' sense of a shared identity. By 1935 almost all of the city's Morrell workers were at 3. The profile of the Morrell work force for 1900 is based on a compilation of information on 1,131 people who worked at the plant between February 1899 and June 1900. The names were gathered from McCoy's Ottumwa City Directory for 1899-1900, the U.S. manuscript census for 1900, and a plant timebook from 1899 (located in box 24, John Morreil and Company Records, Special Collections, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City), The profile of the work force for 1915 is based on information gathered on 1,044 Morrell employees listed in the State of Iowa manuscript census for that year least second-generation Ottumwans or native-born Americans of English, Swedish, or German descent who had migrated from the nearby towns and rural areas of south central Iowa. During the 1920s, especially, a large portion of the rural population of south central Iowa migrated to Ottumwa and some other cities of the region.* Many Morrell workers had grown up in farming families or had participated in the small-scale coalmining industry that dotted the region. Of the latter, many brought with them to Morrell prior affiliations with the United Mine Workers.^ Morreil's work force consisted in large part of fundamentalist Protestants who attended churches that espoused an evangelical and often millennial Christian message of spiritual conversion.* Only a handful of fraternal orga- The enthusiasm of the union-building period at Morrell flowed from the close-knit and culturally uniform character of the packing community. Before the certification election in October 1937, about 60 percent of Morrell's employees, and 34 of the 70 members of the union grievance committee, lived in the immediate packing neighborhood. The boundaries of this neighborhood corresponded neatly with Ottumwa's Ward One. Another 19 members of the grievance committee lived in Ward Five, immediately adjacent to Ward One. Clearly, workers elected departmental leaders who shared a neighborhood with them as well as worked with them. Union meetings regularly included exhortations from packing neighborhood fundamentalist Protestant ministers, some of whom worked in the plant. 'B etween 1938 and 1945, Local No. 1 effectively channeled its members' cultural and union solidarity into two types of political action with two objectives. Through collective bargaining and informal job actions, workers hoped to create a more democratic work environment. They also used both types of political action to elevate the status of the packing community in the city as a whole.
Workers' efforts to secure a written collective bargaining agreement commenced shortly after the union had been certified. From January to March 1938, the union threatened repeatedly to strike if the company did not sign a contract including provisions for a closed shop and dues checkoff. much in actual contractual gains, but Morrell did agree to retain all union members. The company did not grant workers the union shop and dues checkoff until the National War Labor Board pressured the company to sign a master agreement with its ClO-organized plants in Ottumwa and Topeka in 1943 . In that year, the PWOC received its international union charter from the CIO and became the United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA).^Ô ttumwa's packing workers were much more successful between 1938 and the end of World War II in securing informal agreements involving production standards. In this respect, Morreil's policy of allowing supervisors to "rule" their departments autonomously played directly into the hands of the union. By directing their solidarity into militant job actions, workers in the two key plant departments, the pork and beef kill and cut, were able to pressure supervisors into new agreements about the pace of the work. These informal arrangements lasted through the end of World War 11.^V irgil Bankson recalled one of the most important of those job actions. Clarence "Bronc" Poney, one of the floorsmen (skinners) in the beef kill, initiated a sit-down strike in the department. Poney hoped to assert the beef kill workers' power to control the speed of the chain used to regulate how many cattle were killed per hour. Bankson indicated that before the certification of the PWOC local, the company had always 14. See especially the oral histories cited in n. 13. established the rate. Furthermore, the rate might vary from one day to another. Morrell had generally encouraged a fast pace by paying a "lead-off floorsman a couple of cents more per hour than the others. Poney announced one day that this practice would continue no longer, and the rest of the men in the department followed suit. The foremen, especially Leo O'Malley, ridiculed Poney to keep him moving, but the men refused to budge. Finally, the beef department superintendent. Art Woodman, agreed to talk to Poney after work. When Poney brought the whole gang to the meeting. Woodman agreed informally to allow a rate of sixteen beef per floorsman. That pace would remain the accepted standard until after World War 11.^5
While increasing its power in the plant. Local No. 1 aggressively expanded its presence in city politics. Part of this expansion occurred when Local No. 1 created the Ottumwa Industrial Union Council (OIUC) in 1939. Local No. 1 members dominated this CIO citywide labor body. Although the competing AFL central labor body, the Trades and Labor Assembly, was older and represented more unions, the OIUC soon overshadowed it. The OIUC spurred the establishment of the CIO union in the city's John Deere plant and led attempts to form CIO unions in traditionally AFL sectors, such as the city's truck drivers in 1941. Beginning in 1940, Local No. 1 also regularly began to run candidates for city offices. In the 1940 school board election, the union tried to place a former Local No. 1 president on the board. Although it was not successful, the effort did strike fear in the city's business and professional community when union member Charles Sears ran neck and neck with Ernest Manns, who had been a member of the board for twenty years.'L ocal No. l's greatest political victory came during the war years, however. Twice, in 1941 and 1944 tions of working-class voters in defeating proposals to institute a city-manager form of government. Beginning in early 1941, the Citizens Committee for the Council-Manager Plan proposed that Ottumwa hire a salaried city manager to "administer the city's business." The city council would then become an unpaid body of public servants. Morrell executives played a leading role in attempting to replace the city's commission system with this new form of government. The advocates of the city-manager plan baldly stated that labor's influence made it impossible to "ELECT and KEEP men of ABILITY in office." The plan's opponents, led by the OIUC, argued that it was a blatant attempt to remove working people from local political affairs. Using language that purposely evoked strong class sentiments in laboring people still struggling for gains in the workplace, opponents asserted that the city-manager plan would mean ' ONE-MAN AUTHORITY" and would deprive citizens of "political and personal liberty." Ottumwa's residents, they continued, were being asked to "adopt the dictator plan and have a stranger rule us!" In the union's first political success in the city, the plan failed by a margin of more than two-to-one in the city as a whole and by much wider margins in the working-class precincts. In 1944, after racketeering charges resulted in the dismissal of the city's safety commissioner and nearly ended the mayor's reign, the business and professional community, this time more overtly led by the Foster family, again attempted to secure passage of the city-manager plan. But again, they failed. This time, the vote was just short of a two-to-one margin.'Â s the packing community's power grew during the war, both Morrell's management and much of Ottumwa's business and professional community organized a counteroffensive. The first and most direct challenge came when Morrell reasserted managerial authority in the plant. Between 1942 and 1947, Morrell introduced a more systematic and centralized approach to its production efforts. A new industrial engineering department initiated time studies, and, immediately after the war, a restructuring of administrative hierarchies gave the plant superintendent greater authority in production decisions. Not coincidentally, many older supervisors, including Ernest 17. See Ottumwa Daily Courier, 7-19 March 1941; and 8 Aprll-21 June 1944. Manns, who had been terrors of their departments before the war, retired or were fired during this postwar period.^Î n 1946 Local No. 1 participated in the UPWA's nationwide strike. The strike was cast locally into the evolving power struggle between the packing community and Morrell. The strike also gave Morrell an opportunity to build alliances with Ottumwa's residents. After ten days of peaceful picketing following the UPWA's strike announcement on January 16, President Harry Truman authorized the government to seize the nation's packing plants. George M. Foster, Morrell's president, solemnly announced on the front page of the Ottumwa Daily Courier that he would run the plant on the government's behalf. The implicit but obvious message was that the company was acting patriotically while the union was not. Still, this bad local press did not dampen the local's sense of triumph. When Local No. 1 voted to return to work three days later, workers received a sixteen-cent-per-hour wage hike, like all UPWA and Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen {AFL) locals nationwide.'T he strike bolstered the union's confidence and further hardened the company's resolve to block any additional union gains. Morrell continued to restructure its management. In the spring of 1947 Charles L. Campbell was appointed to the now crucial position of plant superintendent. A long and diligent student of the "drive" method of supervision, Campbell had 18. Morrell Magazine, March 1944, 8; August 1946, 3; and SeptemberOctober 1946, 9 ; Harold Poney, interview; Gilbert Baker, interview with author, 4 August 1982; and John (Jack) Moses, interview with author, 12 September 1982. Both Baker and Moses worked in the Industrial engineering department during these years and were involved in the company's more "scientific" approach to production decisions. 19. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 28 PWA officials were convinced that packers located in rural areas were hiring such people because they would presumably be less interested in union participation. Thus, beginning in 1944, the UPWA extended its political support for Democratic candidates into rural areas. In 1946 they added farmer-labor relations to their list of major programs. The UPWA encouraged locals situated in rural areas to establish their own farmer-labor committees and conduct meetings focusing on issues of concern to rural residents, farmers, and city laborers. Ottumwa formed one of the first such local union committees during the spring of 1947 following the UPWA's successful arbitration of a milk producers' strike in the city. The packing community demonstrated its solidarity during the early days of the strike by maintaining a picket line six and one-half miles long around the plant. Public officials, fearing that the strikers might become violent, began to plan how to combat them. A few days after the strike began in early March, officials closed all the taverns in the packing neighborhood, citing instances of public drunkenness among strikers. On April 5, Local No. 1 issued a bulletin claiming that Ottumwa Safety Commissioner Charles Carlson was considering the use of fire hoses on picketers since they "would be better than using gun butts." Carlson denied the statement, but quickly added that fire hoses would be used only if a riot broke out.^B ecause of the unity strikers exhibited in March, Morrell officials decided in early April to test the union's strength by shipping meat out of the plant. Morrell knew that strikers would interpret such an attempt as an initiation of business activity proscribed during strikes by prior agreements. Jim Collins, a foreman who worked in the plant during the strike, later described the company's plan as "an attempt to break the March 1945, 4-5; and December 1952, 2 . Also see "UPWA Program for Building Toward Farmer-Labor Unity," 9 April 1947, box 490, folder 10, UPWA Records. This document offers the union's rationale for initiating the program, reviews its efforts to date, and gives a preliminary assessment of the success of the program. For a sample of the UPWA's evaluation of Local No, l's farmer-labor efforts, see "A Roundup of What is Happening in Farmer-Labor Relations," c. August 1947, box 298, folder 11, UPWA Records. For more information on the general context of the CIO's farmer-labor political activities in the period (for example, the Farm Equipment Workers were even more active in this field than the UPWA), see Wilson J. Warren, "The 'People's Century' in Iowa: Coalition-Building among Farm and Labor Organizations, 1945 Organizations, -1950 union by shipping meat out." When Morrell officials attempted to move five railcars loaded with meat out of the plant on April 7 and 8, massed picketers successfully blocked the cars from leaving. On April 9, however, Iowa District Court judge Harold V. Levis issued a temporary injunction that thoroughly undercut the massed unity the strikers had demonstrated. The injunction stipulated that just five people could picket at each picket station (instead of the dozens who had done so previously), and that strikers could not barricade plant entrances and exits or impede employees entering or leaving the plant. In addition, the injunction named 220 union activists who could be charged with contempt if any of the injunction's restraints on picketing the plant were violated.^"* Apart from painting the words SCAB MEAT on the side of some of the railcars involved in the attempt to move meat out of the plant, Ottumwa's packing community had not engaged in any violence before April 9. The injunction changed the strikers' tactics, however. Because of this legal restraint. embarked on a type of "guerrilla warfare" to forcibly dissuade foremen and other supervisors, the only employees the company could persuade to process meat, from carrying on such activities. Strikers either verbally or physically assaulted managerial personnel involved in production during the strike. Typically, strikers would follow foremen and supervisors when they left the plant, and attack them at or near their homes. Virgil Bankson later explained that such "violence was necessary" from the union's perspective; union leaders now felt that they were involved in a life-and-death struggle to save their union. From their perspective, it was the company that had violated earlier agreements by attempting to initiate business activities during the strike. Under the restraint of the injunction, union leaders could not bring the strength of the packing community's solidarity to bear against the company. They therefore condoned a type of "directed" violence in the hope of maintaining their strike effort. This type of violence differed from the random violence that broke out in other midwestern packing centers during the 1948 strike. In Omaha, for instance, union leaders made little concerted effort to have strikers strategically direct their violence. Instead, union members committed random acts of violence that four major UPWA local unions and their leaders could not controL^M orrell quickly responded to this guerrilla warfare by targeting for prosecution Local No. 1 leaders who had participated in such violence. On April 15, Donald Jones, Local No. l's president in 1947, was arrested for contempt of the injunction. Jones had allegedly participated in an attack on three foremen. During the following week, four rank-and-file members were arrested on similar charges, but Morrell pressed charges only against Jones. Iowa District Judge Harold V. Levis heard evidence in the Jones contempt case from April 21 to 27. In the meantime, Levis added an additional 255 strikers' names to the injunction. While the Jones case was under way, the Ottumwa Daily Courier left no doubt about its stand on the actions of Jones and fellow strikers. "Evidence is multiplying that lawless goon squads are patrolling the city streets and neighboring highways to terrorize persons connected with John Morrell and Co." Morrell officials, as well as growing segments of the business and professional community, were now adamant that the union's ranks were filled with thugs who condoned criminal activity. The union's opponents charged that its workers were not only lawbreakers; they were lazy as well. President George M. Foster publicly proclaimed, "Our experience with the Ottumwa local has been bad. Courier, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23 April 1948, In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the packing community's perspective on the strike and its conduct was increasingly isolated. Ottumwa's packing workers were by no means alone in this respect. Nationally, organized labor's power and prestige were in retreat by 1948, particularly following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Although historians have since downplayed the effect of the act's restrictions on labor, there is little doubt that both the AFL and CIO then saw it as a blow to their strength.^'' Locally, the isolation of the packing community was reflected in Judge Levis's decision against Donald Jones. Two other strikers present at the altercation, Jim Hammersley and Bernard Jones, Donald's brother, testified that Donald Jones was not involved in the fight. In fact, both men attested that they verbally confronted one of the foremen, Claude Smith, after he got out of a car that had stopped at the home of another Morrell supervisory employee. Smith then struck Bernard Jones with a flashlight. Smith's assault only prompted both men to attack Smith. Of the nine other foremen present at the scene, only one corroborated Smith's claim that Donald Jones was involved in the fight. Yet on April 28, Judge Levis found Jones guilty of contempt and ordered him to serve sixty days in the county jail. Levis's reasoning in his decision is particularly revealing.
The circumstances surrounding the whole affair lead to the conclusion that the mission of the occupants of the two cars which followed the Morrell car for a distance of four or five miles across the city was not a peaceable one, but rather, it appears that the occupants of the two cars were acting in concert to follow the Morrell car until it stopped for the purpose of using coercion, intimidation and force upon its occupants, Levis continued that the union men "must have rushed almost en masse to the door of the Morrell car" (emphasis added). The resulting confusion would account for the contradictions in the 27. One of the most respected scholarly assessments of the Taft-Hartley Act can be found in Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions: labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, Í880-1960 (Cambridge, 1985) , 247-316. foremen's testimony about Jones's participation in the fight. Jones himself repeatedly insisted in interviews conducted over the following twenty-five years that he had not participated in the fight. Nevertheless, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld Jones's conviction on April 11, 1949, but reduced his sentence to thirty days. The message was clear: public order as interpreted by the company and state and local officials must prevail despite the packing community's perception that their avenues of acceptable action had been undercut by the injunction.^Â fter the beginning of May, the company had greater success in attracting replacement workers. In a list compiled in 1950 to prevent their employment at the plant, Local No. l's records showed that just seventy-two active union members crossed the picket lines, while an additional 139 nonunion members worked in the plant before the strike ended. To be sure, the number of scabs was small. Still, the backgrounds of the replacement workers provide some insight into the sources of dissension growing within the local union. Based on information on the addresses of sixty-two union members who crossed the picket lines, the largest segment (37 percent) lived at rural route addresses or in small farming towns. In comparison, although it was still home to by far the largest number of plant workers, the immediate packing neighborhood surrounding the plant contributed only 16 percent of the scabs.^T he only other significant difference between the urban and rural workers was that the rural component did not participate to nearly the same extent in the four largest social organizations for working people in the city: the Eagles, Moose, American Legion, and Veterans of Foreign Wars.^" As had 30. This observation is based on a work force profile developed for Morrell workers who were employed at the plant in 1951. Using information included in obituaries in the Ottumwa Courier between 1988 and 1991, supplemented by information on these workers provided by the 1951 Polk's Ottumwa City Directory, 1 developed profiles for 116 deceased Morrell work-already been the case in the 1930s, the packing community situated in the immediate plant environs provided considerable membership in the fraternal organizations that catered to working people in Ottumwa. (The VFW drew significant numbers only after World War II.) Although the content or programs of these fraternals was not overtly political, they functioned as part of the packing community's range of social ties, both formal and informal, that contributed to its solidarity. The importance of Morrell workers in these fraternals was evident during the 1948 strike when the American Legion post's membership voted to donate $1,500 to Local No. l's strike fund. Even though a slightly higher percentage of the rural component's males were veterans of World War II, few of them were willing or able to travel to Ottumwa to belong to the local American Legion or VFW posts. Morrell workers apparently hoped to tap the American Legion as an additional source of financial aid. However, the executive board of the post, which was dominated by business and professional allies of the company, turned down the membership's request.-^'
Whereas the urban component of Morrell's work force was knit closely not only by membership in Local No. 1 but also by a wider circle of social affiliations, this broader social participation was largely absent from the rural components of the work force. Thus, while Local No. l's leaders had attempted to educate and incorporate the fanners and working-class rural resiers who had worked in the plant in 1951. Whereas 31 (27 percent) lived at rural or small-town addresses in that year, the other 85 (73 percent) lived In Ottumwa. Typically, the Courier's obituaries provide consistent and detailed information about workers' ages, marital status, veteran status, and religious affiliations as well as lists of their memberships in various social organizations. In terms of birthplaces, 72 percent of the urban component had been born in either Wapello County or adjacent counties versus 87 percent for the rural component. Regarding marital status, 86 percent of the urban proportion were married, while 81 percent of the rural workers were married. The largest segments of both groups were members of fundamentalist Protestant sects (54 percent for the urban, 45 percent for the rural), and almost one half of both groups' males were veterans of World War II (43 percent for the urban, 48 percent for the rural). These small differences contrast with those marking the difference between the two groups on other social memberships: 54 percent of the urban workers belonged to one or more social organizations compared to only 29 percent of the rural workers. 31. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 12, 26 May 1948. dents of the area into its culture of solidarity before 1948, these people were not enmeshed in the broader network of social relations that undergirded this culture. Accordingly, they were not sensitive to the traditions and concerns that had prompted the packing community's successful union-building. These attributes help to explain the greater propensity of rural workers to cross the picket line during the strike."
On May 27, Local No. 1 voted to end its participation in the UPWA's strike and settled according to terms set by the company. The 1948 strike was a key turning point in the evolution of the packing community's political solidarity in Ottumwa. Although superficially the local emerged from the strike intact, the packing community would now be on the defensive. Its solidarity was increasingly disrupted not only by even more aggressive company strategies in dealing with the union, but by the company's continued employment of rural workers. Morrell also learned to count on support for its positions from Ottumwa's business and professional community after the 1948 strike. Morrell had successfully raised the specter of persistent meat famines and continuing declines in the city's retail business if such strikes occurred again. Such threats carried considerable weight in Ottumwa, since 75 percent of the meat sold there in 1945 came from the Morrell plant, and retail business declined by 50 percent in the town during the two-month strike in 1948. 33. In assessing the aftermath of the 1948 strike for the UPWA, David Brody, The Butcher Workmen, 235, says, "The central fact was that the crushing defeat and internal breakdown did not destroy the UPWA; recovery was quick and convincing." In Ottumwa's case, however. Local No, 1 s postwar experiences MORRELL'S STRATEGY in fighting the union in the plant from 1949 to 1951 involved a persistent refusal to recognize Local No. l's right to contest production decisions made by the company. Specifically, Morrell introduced "job load" changes; that is, the company decreased the number of workers in various departments while increasing the pace of production. These changes were established in the wake of time studies undertaken by the company's industrial engineering department and were enforced by Plant Superintendent "Mad Dog" or 'Do It or Else" Campbell (as the union now referred to him). The changes occurred primarily in the union strongholds of the beef and hog departments, where they undermined the informal production arrangements the union had established before the end of World War IL Between 1949 and 1951, Morrell repeatedly refused to bargain with either Local No. 1 or international representatives of the UPWA on the issue of production decisions related to job loads. When the local called strikes, walked out, or stopped work over company refusals to listen to their side, the company not only suspended hundreds of workers but regularly used the pages of the Ottumwa Daily Courier to publicize the union's alleged refusal to perform "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay."^Î n the face of the company's increased resolve after the 1948 strike to disrupt collective bargaining and reshape combelie his statement. The statistic on the contribution of local Morrell meats to Ottumwa's retail market is from Ottumwa Daily Courier, 6 April 1945; that for the decline in retail business is from ibid., 4 May 1948. On the negotiations between labor and management leading up to the decision of Local No. 1 to return to work, see Ottumwa Daily Courier, 5, 7, 10, 14, 22, 28 May 1948. 34 . The sources for the contest between the union and Morrell between 1949 and 1951 over production-related issues include Morrell Magazine, National Provisioner (the meatpacking industry's periodical), and Ottumwa Daily Courier, all of which were "mouthpieces" for the company's side, and, for the union. The Bulletin (Local No. l's official paper). Packinghouse Worker, and Edward Filliman's weekly reports to the UPWA international office. See especially Morreli Magazine, December 1948 , February 1949 , and April 1952 National Provisioner, 17 December 1949; Ottumwa Daily Courier, 23 February, 1 May 1949 , 24, 26 March 1951 The Bulletin, 15 April, 2,16 May, 6, 20 June, 13, 18, 25 July, 15 August, 19 September 1949, box 411, folder 7, and box 441, UPWA Records; and Packinghouse Worker, 1 October 1948 and 9 September 1949 . A nearly complete set of Edward Filliman's UPWA field representative reports from 1949 to 1951 are included in box 411, folder 7 (1949 reports) and box 415, folder 13 (1950-51 reports), UPWA Records. munity attitudes, the local attempted over the course of the next three years to recapture its prestrike aggressiveness in combating the company. The union adopted a concerted policy of attacking Morrell as an enemy of all working people in Ottumwa. Noting that after the speed-ups in 1949, seventyfive workers produced as much as one hundred workers had ten years earlier. The Bulletin, Local No. l's weekly paper, proclaimed, "John Morrell and Company will ruin your health and drive you to your grave 15 years ahead of time. John Morrell and Company is our common enemy. Let's concentrate on an all-out effort to defeating [sic] them." Morrell responded to such attacks in what was now their typical post-World War II style: they took out a newspaper advertisement. In reply to the union's outburst, the company rhetorically asked Local No. 1 in a quarter-page advertisement to explain what it meant when it said that it wanted to "defeat" the company. "Where will you workers go if the company is put out of business?" Local No. 1 noted in its own (smaller) ad that, as usual, the company's remarks were meant for public consumption and confused the issues. Although Morrell had praised Local No. 1 for their "magnificent job" during the war, now, even though overall production had increased, workers were told that the company expected a fair day's work for a fair day's pay! "If the company was fair minded and believed in humanity, they would sit down and work out some fair agreement [involving job loads]."^Â lthough initially aggressive on these issues, by 1951 a combination of financial turmoil, weakening resolve by the local union's leadership, and decreasing support from the international union's leadership combined to sap Local No. l's ability to contest the company on production-related issues. Edward Filliman, the UPWA international representative assigned to the plant, and a former union leader there during the local's heyday, noted in 1951 that the company continued to hire new workers from outside the city. Those new workers presumably replaced workers who had participated in the 35 who ran for office even received enough votes in the primaries to make it onto the general election ballot. Indeed, in those years, the packing community did not give undivided support to its own people. This may have been because the candidates were local union officials embroiled in financial problems that disrupted the local during the early 1950s. Undoubtedly exasperated over the multitude of problems the local was experiencing, Edward Filliman noted in one of his weekly reports in 1951 that too many of Local No. l's officers were "Do-Nothing, Money-Grabbing individuals." In addition, just one of the dozen Local No. l's executive board members in 1951 had taken a leading role in the union-building that had occurred in the 1930s and early 1940s.^T he final blow to the packing community's political power in Ottumwa fell in 1953 when the council-manager plan of city government finally replaced the commission form. Defeat of the plan had been one of the local's greatest triumphs in 1941 and 1944 . Yet in 1953 No. l's executive board refused to allocate more than a paltry sum to fight it, it passed
